Among the problems of binary remote attestation, scalability has often been mentioned in literature because a verifier must know all possible measurements considered acceptable. In this paper, we show that scalability is a manageable issue when attesting a Linux distribution. The main issues remain identifying, with low time impact, the scripts executed, the configuration of components and other files types.
INTRODUCTION
Remote attestation is the process performed by a verifier to assess if a remote platform is trusted, i.e., according to the Trusted Computing Group (TCG), if it "will behave in a particular manner for a specific purpose" [1] . The TCG specified the building blocks of a Trusted Platform providing the primitives for the so called binary attestation, which consists in identifying the running components (and their configuration) through their digests, to infer the platform behavior. Among the problems of binary remote attestation, scalability has often been mentioned in literature because a verifier must know all possible measurements considered acceptable. They include the measurements of the running components -problem that can be referred to as code-diversity -and of their configuration -that can be referred to as system configuration. To overcome these issues, other approaches have been proposed in the literature: property-based [2] and model-based [3] attestation. In this paper, we present work-in-progress experiments showing that code diversity is a manageable issue to attest a complete Linux distribution.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. We also show that there is a path to address the configuration of components, whilst problems to be solved are present, like identifying the executed scripts with a low impact on the performance and other file types (keys and logs).
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we review the literature on scalability and preface our contribution. Section 3 is focused on code-diversity: we present our approach, methodology and tests results. Section 4 is about experiments on configuration. We conclude with Section 5.
ON SCALABILITY
We review the definition of scalability in the context of remote attestation, by analyzing its occurrence in literature.
Scalability has often been mentioned as one of the main problems that limit the feasibility of binary attestation. For instance, "Binary attestation requires the verifier to know all potential hash-values of all (combinations of all) components of any machine that it may be required to verify. Knowing all acceptable configurations is hard to manage" [4] and "The remote attestation process requires for the verifier that it knows about all possible binary measurements that are acceptable as secure software components for a given purpose. Any customization of security-critical components yields a further difficulty [...]" [5] .
In both contributions, we can identify two aspects of the scalability problem. According to England [6] , the first one is code-diversity, related to the identification of the processes running on a platform, while the second one is verifying the configuration of these processes.
Whilst England provides figures that seem to question the viability of remote attestation (e.g., "a typical Windows installation loads 2,000 or more drivers from a known set of more than 4 million" -the latter growing at 4,000 per day), at least for the code-diversity these numbers are actually manageable by current database systems, as demonstrated by the existence of companies such as Bit9 or CoreTrace that actually base their business on application whitelisting. Bit9, for example, runs a Global Software Registry containing "over 5 billion records, [...] growing at a rate of up to 20 million files each day" [7] (this was already pointed out by Lyle et al. [8] ).
More precise statements are given by Sailer et al. [9] : "Client measurements grow linearly with the number of new software modules executed. [...] Verification time per measurement is constant (based on hash table retrieval), so the verification time is also linear in the number of measurements of the client. The verification space is linear with the size of the distribution".
Our contribution. Our long-term goal is to perform a remote attestation of a complete Linux distribution, intended as a real product running on commodity computers and not just as a prototype demonstrating that binary attestation is technically feasible. A first minimal outcome is to verify that only software "known to be good" is running. A more ambitious one would be determining the platform configuration and useful security properties. In this work we report the results of our experiments on the path towards our long-term goal and show, in line with [9] , that scalability is manageable. In detail we discuss the identification of the software running on a platform from the code-diversity perspective and we analyze the problem of attesting the configuration of each component. We also provide preliminary results on the performance of our approach.
ON CODE-DIVERSITY
We report the experimental methodology, detailed as clientside setup and reference database (internals and verification procedure), followed by experimental results and costs. Experimental methodology. We chose Fedora Linux 14 as distribution for our experiments. The client platform to be attested is a commodity computer equipped with 2.6GHz Intel CPU, 2GB RAM and Infineon TPM v.1.2: we have tested on it different installations and configurations of Fedora (details are given later). On the verifier side we built a reference database containing all "known good values", i.e. the digests of all files belonging to Fedora 14 packages. For this purpose we use a dedicated commodity computer equipped with a 3GHz Intel CPU and 4GB RAM. We did not implement attestation protocols; this is out of the scope of this paper and solutions can be found in literature. Client-side setup. As subsystem to measure the files accessed for reading or execution, we chose Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) [10] that does not require any modification to the Operating System as it is integrated in the kernel. It only needs to be enabled at the bootstrap time by adding the parameter ima=on to the kernel command line.
Once the kernel has been initialized, IMA starts measuring the accessed files according to the criteria specified in the policy, which can be automatically set through the kernel command line parameter ima_tcb=1 (that identifies the Standard IMA policy) or provided in user space by writing all its statements to the special file policy, in the securityfs file system. Anytime, the list of measured files (with their digests) is available through another special file ascii_runtime_measurements from the same file system, encoded as ASCII text (or, also, in binary form, through the file binary_runtime_measurements).
In our tests we used three different policies: Execution, Standard and User. All of them share a common part, that instructs IMA to exclude special file systems from the measurements, which is not shown here.
The Execution policy sets IMA to measure executable code only: the main application's binary executed via execve() and the related shared libraries, loaded through the mmap() system call by either the linker-loader, after finding the required dependencies in the ELF header, or by the programs themselves using the glibc function dlopen(). All other nonexecutable files (e.g. for configuration) are not measured. This setting is obtained via the following policy statements. The Standard policy is a superset of the Execution one since it adds all (non-executable) files read by the superuser root to the ones measured via Execution policy. In this case all system configuration files read during the bootstrap process are measured, as well as all files (configurations, plugins, etc.) accessed by the services -like Apache -before they change their user context from root to a less privileged one via setuid(). This setting is obtained via the following policy statements added to the Execution policy.
# Measure all files read by the root user measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
The User policy is a superset of the Standard one and we wrote it with two different specializations: Webserver and Desktop. Indeed, to the files measured via the Standard one, the first policy adds all files read by the Apache Web server after lowering its privileges through setuid(), while the second one includes all files read by the programs executed within the user context with UID = 500 (standard non-privileged user). This setting is obtained via the following policy statements, respectively for the Webserver and Desktop specializations, added to the Standard policy.
# Measure all files read by the apache user measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=48 # Measure all files read by the user with uid 500 measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=500
Beside the variations of the IMA policies, we experimented with variations of the installed system. Indeed we tested three different installation flavors 1 of Fedora: Minimal that contains the essential packages required for a text login shell and to set up a network connection; Webserver with Apache set up to serve a PHP page and Desktop, a simple GNOME setup with some widely used applications: Mozilla Firefox, OpenOffice.org Writer and GIMP.
Each experiment has been performed on a fresh installation with only minimal tweaks required to each installation flavor, i.e. setting the network, updating the initial ramdisk to load the custom IMA policy and uploading the files for the workload simulation. The bootstrap time has been measured using the bootchart 2 tool which "... will run in background and collect process information, CPU statistics and disk usage statistics from the /proc file system".
Once the bootstrap process is completed, for the Minimal flavor we just collected the measurements by accessing the platform through a root shell and copying to another platform the bootchart (/var/log/bootchart.tgz) and the IMA measurements list (ascii_runtime_measurements).
For the other two installation flavors, before taking the measurements as described earlier, we simulated a workload. For Webserver by accessing a PHP test page (which simply displays the output of the phpinfo() function) from a remote platform and for Desktop by opening a new GNOME session, accessing the Fedora 3 Web site and finally opening sample files using in sequence the mentioned applications.
We repeated the experiment for all combinations of installation flavor and IMA policy (except for the User policy with the Minimal installation, since we did not execute any application on behalf of regular users). At the end of this procedure, we checked each IMA measurements list against the reference database, to verify if the measured files were correctly identified as part of Fedora distribution. Test matrix and results are reported in Table 1 and discussed later. Remark. Attesting that no (known) malicious binary is running on a platform is feasible, as shown later, but it does not mean that "no malicious software" is being executed. Beside binaries deemed up-to-date but holding flaws not discovered yet, script interpreters like bash or python pose a number of problems. Depending on how a script is invoked, directly as command (./test_script.sh) or as a parameter of the interpreter (bash test_script.sh), when IMA is set for the Execution policy, respectively measures the script or not. The Standard policy is then required to capture all scripts irrespective of the invocation method. Further, to make things worse, IMA does not report the operation performed on measured files and, thus, the related security impact, so that one measurement may refer to a script executed by the interpreter or to a configuration file read by the latter (e.g. bash bash_history). Reference database: internals and data. We built the reference database with Apache Cassandra 4 . This is a highly-scalable NoSQL database, suitable to manage huge amount of data with a key-value structure: it is an actual candidate for offering a real service by adding new nodes for data partitions or replicas.
The Cassandra data model is based on the concept of Column, an elementary data structure with a name (or key), a value and a timestamp. It also supports a more complex data structure, called SuperColumn, whose value consists in a map of Columns, instead of plain data. The container that encloses them is called ColumnFamily, which in the first instance can be considered as a table in relational databases, but it appears more akin to an associative array, because data it stores do not have a fixed structure. A client can arrange data by giving the server only the row , i.e. the key of the associative array, to retrieve the data, or the row together with the Column or SuperColumn he wants to insert. We found this model suitable for our purposes, since it provides the necessary flexibility for storing arbitrary data about files provided with the distribution, keyed by hash, as well as information about all packages identified by name.
Our database is organized around two main ColumnFamilies: FilesToPackages and PackagesHistory.
FilesToPackages binds the digest of each file (the row ) to its full path name and the packages (the Columns) in which it is contained. The latter are further grouped by the distribution name and the processor architecture (the SuperColumn) to speed up the data analysis.
For binary executable files, the SuperColumn also includes a Column named executable, which contains a list of the linked shared libraries. Since this list may include the name of links, instead of regular files, the SuperColumn also contains the Column aliases, only for shared libraries, to store the name of all their symbolic links. 
The possible update types are: newpackage, which identifies new packages, enhancement, which means that the package contains new features, bugfix, which reports that nonsecurity critical bugs have been corrected and, lastly security, which indicates that security vulnerabilities found in a older version have been solved.
The database is daily updated as described in the following. First, new packages and updates are downloaded from the official Fedora repository (with rsync).
Then, a python script unpacks the fetched packages, computes the sha1 hash value of the files contained and eventually inserts the measurements and the full path name into the ColumnFamily named FilesToPackages. The script collects additional information about unpacked files: it determines whether the file is an ELF main executable (with readelf) and in this case it retrieves the list of linked shared library (with ldd); or it resolves the name of the regular file for links to shared libraries. This information is used to update data previously inserted into FilesToPackages.
Finally, the script populates PackagesHistory through bodhi 6 , a service offered by Fedora which provides information about its packages, including the update type. Reference database: verifying a platform. We created a second python script that can be used by a verifier (also via Web front-end 7 ) to query the database and perform the analysis to validate the platform configuration. At this stage, our verification method consists in checking if digests of files, collected by IMA in the client platform, are recognized as part of Fedora. Anyway, a deeper analysis is necessary to assert that all components running on a platform are good. Therefore, the script verifies if a measured file is up-to-date or if a newer version has been released to fix security flaws, by using the version and the full history of the packages containing it. Further, by using the dependencies between main executables and libraries, the script can evaluate if a whole process is up-to-date or not.
The script exploits the Cassandra multiget query to batch requests. The verification process requires two queries: the first one to identify the software running on the platform; the second one, to assess the freshness of the components.
In the first query, the script determines which measurements correspond to software provided within the distribution. It queries the database by sending all the digests collected by IMA and receives the associated SuperColumns of FilesToPackages. The measurements that are not returned indicate files not provided within the distribution.
The result of this first query is the basis for the analysis that, depending on the verifier's requirements, can stop whenever a single unknown file exists, or can proceed trying to derive finer information about what is known or unknown.
Here we describe a graph-based analysis that determines the freshness of each process running, taking into account the dependency from shared libraries.
The script builds a graph whose nodes are files and packages and edges represent dependencies. Each node has an attribute describing its status. From data returned by the first query, the script: 1) creates a file node for each measurement; 2) sets the status for each file node; 3) indexes shared libraries by file name and all its aliases; 4) for each executable, connects its linked shared libraries to it; 5) creates a package node for each package found in the query result; 6) connects each package to the files that it contains.
In step 2, the status can be: ok or not-found if the hash value was respectively found or not in the database; namemismatch if the name returned from the database for a given digest differs from that in the measurement list. In step 4, executables are recognized by the presence of the executable Column in the SuperColumn. In this case, the list of libraries (by file names or aliases) stored in the column allows to find which file nodes need to be connected. Libraries not present in the graph (because of measurements missing) are added anyway as file nodes with status fake and connected to the executable to make the algorithm correct.
After these steps, a second query to the database is performed to decide if the software running on the platform being attested is up-to-date. The script selects all packages returned by the first query, concatenates their name with that of client platform's distribution, and sends the obtained row s to the database. The database replies with the SuperColumns of PackagesHistory that contain the version and release numbers of requested packages as delivered by the vendor of the given distribution.
For each package, the script: 1) finds all newer versions than the one from the first query; 2) checks the update type of each newer version and selects the most critical one; 3) updates the status attribute of the package node. Here, the status can be ok if the package is up-to-date, bugfix if a newer version fixes non-security critical bugs or security if discovered security flaws are solved in a more recent version.
Then, the script performs a breadth first propagation of the status in the graph: the status of packages is propagated to files and the status of libraries to binary executables linking them (security overwrites bugfix that overwrites ok ). For instance, a status security from the package openssl is propagated to libssl.so and then to Apache mod_ssl.
At the end of the execution, the script returns to the verifier the result of the verification either in table form, with the information collected for each file and package, or in graphical form, with an image of the graph. Remote attestation: experimental results. The test matrix with the results of the measurements on the client side and the verifications are reported in Table 1 . For each combination of installation flavor and IMA policy (the selected options are indicated by the text respectively of row and column headers), three figures are reported: (1) the total number of measurements done by IMA according to the selected policy; (2) the percentage of unknown measurements, i.e. digests not found in the reference database: the corresponding files are not recognized as part of Fedora; (3) the verification time expressed in seconds. Each figure, related to a single combination, is the average value of verification times measured during five tests: we used the system timer within the script to measure these times for the whole verification procedure, excluding all communications and the data rendering. We restarted Cassandra before each test to flush its cache.
The figures for the Execution policy show that all executable code (main application binaries and shared libraries) running on the platform, from the bootstrap to the time the list of IMA measurements is saved, is recognized as part of Fedora. This is a first positive result.
Moreover, our verification procedure also checks whether a file recognized as part of Fedora is up-to-date or not and, in the latter case, for which reason.
These results show that we reached our minimal goal, i.e. verifying that only software "known to be good" is running.
Besides, we found a low percentage of measurements (12%, in the worst case), in the lists obtained with the Standard and User policies, that were not recognized (i.e. the returned digests were not in the database).
A deeper look at those records, e.g. for the case DesktopUser, shows that the number of unrecognized files is lower. Indeed, out of 386 records, 151 are just violation reports (i.e. a reader and writer access a file at the same time), thus obtaining 235 records for unknown files. Further, records with the same file name appear often. Since the IMA version used in our tests is not able to report more information about measured files than their name, it is not possible to distinguish if two records with the same file name refer to a single inode or to two different ones. However, we verified that in our client installation no duplicate files exist, so in our test bed multiple records with the same file name represent multiple measurements of the same file. Therefore, taking only the records with unique file names and excluding the record boot_aggregate (that reports the digest of aggregated values from PCR0 to PCR7) lead to identify just 186 unknown files (i.e. 5%).
After a further inspection to them, we noted that the unrecognized files can be classified in three main categories: configuration files, keys or logs. We refer the reader to Section 4 for a method that allows to reduce the number of unknown measurements for configuration files. Remote attestation: the costs. The cost of the verification in terms of time appears to be reasonable. In fact, the chosen test bed and the experiments setup -i.e. a single node configuration on a standard commodity desktop, only one request at a time and the cache flushed at every test -were not intended to measure the performance of our reference database using an optimized, production-like, configuration of Cassandra. Our goal was only to check whether there is a reasonable upper bound for the verification time that makes our approach feasible or not: we think that for these preliminary tests, a worst case of 3.3s is acceptable (note that the TPM requires about a second to sign).
In Table 2 we reported the measured time of the bootstrap with IMA disabled and we repeated the procedure for each of the three mentioned policies to show the overhead of measuring. The cost of having IMA enabled on the client platform is quite relevant, especially in the case of Standard and User policies, required to measure the system configuration and the scripts in addition to executable binaries. We also report the costs of the reference database. Fedora 14, daily updated within 8 months since the release, contains 45GB of packages that result in a database with 1.9GB of data (1GB just for the release version) describing more than 22,000 packages for a total of around 2.9 millions files. During this period we observed more than 14,000 updates with around 3,200 new digests per day, i.e. almost 110MB added to the database per month.
The cost of the reference database for 8 months updates is, in term of space, 4.2% of the size of one distribution version. Under the hypothesis of linear growth, the cost for two years updates would be 8.2%. However we can imagine that whenever a new major version is released, the growth rate for the previous one will be lowered until it will be discontinued. These considerations and the measured verification times show that, on the verifier side, code-diversity can be successfully managed, solely basing on the known good values provided by the Linux distributor.
ON CONFIGURATION
Our experiments showed an unexpectedly high number of measured configuration files matching the original ones included in the packages -about 317 of 360 files residing in the directory /etc -with their digests, hence, present in the reference database.
Besides, some of these configuration files (even if not present in the database) can be re-generated on the verifier side from a template file and simple platform properties. To obtain the same content, the original files should be modified only through the related tools, when available, or validated before their use. Then, reconstructed files can be compared against the measured ones, thus reducing the number of unrecognized digests (in our first tests we identified 20 more files).
To pursue this goal, we took as an example anaconda, the Fedora installer, that generates some configuration files from a fixed structure (stored internally) filled using user selected preferences (stored in anaconda-ks.cfg, with other platform data useful for automated installations). In some cases, anaconda performs this operation by invoking an external program.
We created two python scripts: a collector, that must be run on the client after the bootstrap and generates a file platform_properties.list containing the platform properties, i.e. data from anaconda-ks.cfg and additional data that we identified to reconstruct more configuration files; and a generator, integrated in our verification script, that takes as input platform_properties.list and deals with each configuration file through specific modules, each one managing a single property. To recognize additional configuration files, new properties, not present in anaconda-ks.cfg, must be defined (see, e.g., cdrom in the second example) and new modules must be developed.
# content of platform_properties.list for the examples i18n en_US.UTF-8 latarcyrheb-sun16 cdrom cdrom|cdrw|dvd COMBO_SHC-48S7K pci-0000:00:1f.2-scsi-1:0:0:0 keyboard us firewall --service=http selinux --enforcing timezone Europe/Rome Figure 1 shows how our tool can reconstruct the configuration file /etc/sysconfig/i18n for the language of the Fedora distribution by reading the language identifier and the system font from the standard i18n property, and by formatting these data using the associated template. Figure 2 shows another example, i.e. a rule for udev that defines how optical device files are created during the bootstrap (/etc/udev/rules.d/70-persistent-cd.rules) and that is more complex to be reconstructed. Our tool parses the cdrom property and sets the proper bash environment variables. Then, it launches /lib/udev/write_cd_rules, an external program part of the udev package, which generates the desired rules according to the variables previously set.
We note that many configuration files have a well-known structure (e.g. property=value) useful to derive system properties helpful to assess the overall security, like verifying the authentication methods accepted by SSH server. This observation and our experiments bring to the conclusion that a distributor could easily integrate a tool to automatically reconstruct configuration files and provide the application developers with the related support.
Despite that we successfully identified many configuration files, others were not recognized. Moreover, how to handle the measurements of other file types, such as cryptographic keys or logs, is not yet clear. Finally, we also ran our tests on a non fresh installation of the Desktop flavor: the number of unknown measurements increased from 10% to 20%.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In conclusion, we showed that code-diversity can be managed when attesting a complete Linux distribution: our reference database could be directly maintained by the distributor at low cost. Open issues are identifying scripts with low impact on the performance and files likes keys and logs. For configuration files, instead, we identified a path to be further explored to increase the number of measurements that can be successfully recognized.
